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Summary 
A government bargains a mutually convenient agreement with a multinational corporation 
to extract a natural resource. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a 
return a share on the profits. The host country provides access and guarantee conditions of 
operation. Being the investment totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not 
only for uncertainty on market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real 
options framework where the government holds an American call option on nationalization 
we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining is feasible and leads to attain a 
cooperative agreement maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of 
nationalization does not affect the investment time trigger but only the feasible bargaining 
set. Finally, we show that the optimal sharing rule results from the way the two parties may 
differently trade off rents with option value. 
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Many developing countries are rich in natural resources such as oil, natural gas and minerals.
This endowment may be crucial for funding their economic growth and welfare.1 However,
developing countries may often lack the needed technological knowledge and/or they must
cope with limited funds for exploring the resource ￿elds and building the infrastructures
required for extraction. Foreign direct investment (hereafter, FDI) may overcome these
di¢ culties. In fact, a multinational corporation may be willing to undertake the initial
investment costs and extract the resource if an adequate return is paid. Multinational
corporations may engage in FDI by forming a joint venture with a local ￿rm which is usually
owned by the government (Schnitzer, 2002). The agreement between the two parties entitles
the foreign investor to a property right on the infrastructure installed and to a compensation
for the investment. The compensation may be represented by a share on pro￿t￿ s ￿ ow accruing
from extraction.
However, once the investment has been undertaken, matching the economic interests of
both parties may be problematic. In fact, given the sunk nature of the investment,2 the local
government may expropriate the enterprise￿ s investment and run the project on its own. In
this case, being the host a sovereign country, no court may impose the respect of contract￿ s
terms or a compensation for the assets expropriated.3 Although not on legal ground, the
expropriation may be punished by imposing international sanctions such as a limited access
to world capital markets and restrictions on international trade (Schnitzer, 1999, 2002). In
addition also a cost due to the loss of reputation must be accounted. Nevertheless, even
if a punishment may be triggered, high pro￿ts from extraction and/or populist pressure
on governments for rents￿distribution may justify this opportunistic move on the basis of
bene￿ts covering the costs (Engel and Fischer, 2008).
Nationalizations4 have been an important issue over the sixties and the seventies when
many colonies became independent countries. Later, during the eighties and the nineties,
their frequency5 declined (Minor, 1994). Despite this evidence, a bunch of examples in the
last few years seems to support a new trend. For instance, let us refer to Bolivia whose
leader Morales announced in 2006 a plan to nationalize the local natural gas industry, to
Venezuela where over the last three years the president Chavez ordered the nationalization
of foreign ￿rms in several extractive industries, to Ecuador where a contract with the oil
company Occidental Petroleum was cancelled on 2006.6
However, the relationship between multinational corporations and host countries is char-
1The relationship between natural resource and economic growth is still a controversial issue. See
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) on the "resource curse" debate.
2See Barham et al. (1998) for an analysis of investment in extractive industries and Guasch et al. (2003)
for investment on infrastructures.
3As long as only a light penalty or no penalty at all may be imposed for the violation of the agreement￿ s
terms it is hard to have a host country credibly committed to their respect (Schnitzer, 1999).
4Following Duncan (2006) by expropriation we mean a partial con￿scation of the foreign investor￿ s assets.
Instead, the term nationalization will be used for total con￿scation.
5Data on expropriations have been collected and presented in several studies. See Tomz and Wright
(2008), Kobrin (1984) and Hajzler (2007).
6See http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/17/business/worldbusiness/17oil.html?_r=1 and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationalization for further details.
3acterized not only by such con￿ ict but also by mutual economic interests (Kobrin, 1987).
The activation of the extractive project requires a mutually convenient agreement induc-
ing the initial investment. Needless to say that without investment both parties are worse
o⁄. Mutuality may then lead to a joint venture where the pro￿t distribution accounts and
compensates for the threat of nationalization.
The aim of this paper is to account for con￿ icting and convergent economic interests and
determine such distribution. This will be done setting up a model of cooperative bargaining
where the foreign investor and the local government are viewed as holding an American call
option, respectively on investment and nationalization (Mahajan, 1990). The analysis will
be developed in a real options framework where both investment and nationalization are
economic decisions characterized by uncertain pay-o⁄s and irreversibility. Both parties are
equally exposed to pro￿t ￿ uctuations following a geometric Brownian motion. Uncertain
pro￿ts and irreversibility makes information on future prospects valuable and regret may
be reduced keeping an option open and collecting such information (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994). Finally, di⁄erently from the host, the investor must also account for the threat of
nationalization (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; Long, 1975).
Our proposal to merge cooperative bargaining and real options theories is an innovative
attempt in the literature on political risk. Up to our knowledge only few contributions have
approached expropriation using option pricing methods (Mahajan, 1990; Clark, 1997, 2003).
Since expropriation depends on project pay-o⁄s Mahajan (1990) suggests the contingent
claim analysis to price the expropriation risk. Developing the Mahajan￿ s frame, Clark (1997)
shows that the cost of expropriation for the investor is equal to the value of an insurance
contract covering the ￿rm for the expropriated pro￿ts. In this paper only the position of
the ￿rm is considered and the occurrence of expropriation is modelled as a Poisson process
with a constant exogenous intensity parameter. Clark (2003) extends this frame including in
the model the government￿ s position. This allows to determine the timing of expropriation
through the maximization of the value of the option to expropriate.
Our analysis has a di⁄erent focus in that we study the impact of the threat of nationaliza-
tion on investment. We assume that no compensation is paid to the investor. If nationaliza-
tion occurs, the cost for the government is due to sanctions and loss of reputation while for
the ￿rm the cost is represented by expropriated asset and returns on the initial investment.
Three main features characterize our set-up. First, the lack of a credible commitment on the
respect of initial contract. Second, a foreign investor aware that "almost from the moment
that the signatures have dried on the document, powerful forces go to work that quickly
render the agreements obsolete in the eyes of the government" (Vernon, 1993, p.82). Last,
a mutual interest in the initial investment. In this frame, we let the parties cooperatively
bargain to set up an agreement inducing investment.7 By applying the Nash bargaining
solution concept to the underlying cooperative game we can determine an optimal sharing
rule and fully characterize a cooperative agreement. We ￿nd that to induce investment the
pro￿t distribution must trade o⁄the probability of nationalization with the share paid to the
foreign investor.8 An interesting ￿nding is represented by the invariance of the investment
7See Kobrin (1987) for a review of literature on bargaining paradigm in the extractive sector.
8Di⁄erently from Long (1975) and Brennan and Schwartz (1985) where an exogenous probability of
nationalization is considered.
4time trigger. That is, with or without threat of nationalization the investment occurs at the
same time. On the contrary, the threat of nationalization does impact on the set of feasible
levels for the distributive parameter. In fact, as the threat becomes more severe we show
how its extent shrinks and bargaining failure may occur. We also ￿nd that, as expected, the
multinational corporation￿ s share must be higher than without the threat of nationalization.
This makes economic sense and two possible interpretations are provided. On the one hand,
this wedge can be simply seen as the way the investor is compensated for the additional
risk, while on the other hand it may be viewed as balancing for the local government being
compensated not only through the share on pro￿ts but also indirectly through the option to
expropriate. Developing the last interpretation, we contribute also by proposing the coop-
erative bargaining frame for pricing the option to expropriate. Finally, studying the impact
of market volatility on the investor￿ s share, we can observe two di⁄erent scenarios. On the
￿rst, as uncertainty raises, the foreign corporation accepts a lower share to delay investment.
Such loss is compensated by a high pro￿t level when investing and a less acute threat of
expropriation. On the second, as uncertainty soars up, to encourage earlier investment the
local government accepts a lower share. A more valuable option to expropriate and a lower
trigger for its exercise will balance the loss.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic set-up for
the model is presented. In section 3 we determine the e¢ cient bargaining set where the
cooperative game is played. In section 4 the cooperative game outcome is derived. In
Section 5 we discuss results using comparative statics and illustrate the model by a numerical
solution. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Set-up
Consider a joint investment project for the extraction of a natural resource in a developing
country. The extraction of such resource is lucrative and generates a ￿ ow of non-negative9
pro￿ts ￿t which randomly ￿ uctuates over time following a geometric Brownian motion with
instantaneous growth rate ￿ and instantaneous volatility ￿:
d￿t
￿t
= ￿dt + ￿dWt (1)
where Wt is a Wiener process with E [dWt] = 0 and E [dW 2
t ] = dt.
The two parties forming the joint venture, a multinational corporation (hereafter, MNC)
and the government of the host country (hereafter, HC), are risk-neutral. The project to
be activated requires a sunk investment I > 0: For simplicity we assume that the extractive
project has a term su¢ ciently long that can be approximated by in￿nity. Suppose that
HC is fund-constrained and cannot ￿nance the project while MNC can undertake it. The
parties agree on sharing each unit of pro￿t in two parts, respectively ￿ to MNC and 1￿￿ to
HC where ￿ 2 (0;1). Assume also that once the project is activated, the parties have joint
9The simple form for ￿t may be thought as a reduced form of the more complex ￿t = ￿ (vt) where vt is a
vector representing the several variables (market prices, technology, regulation, etc.) which may a⁄ect such
￿ ow in the reality.
5control on the extractive process and that the plant runs at capacity (Engel and Fischer,
2008).
Once the agreement has been signed MNC holds an option to invest in the extractive
project. Since MNC faces uncertainty about market conditions then delaying the investment
to gather information on future pro￿t realizations may be valuable. Market is not the only
source of uncertainty on MNC￿ s pro￿t ￿ ows. In fact, once the investment is undertaken
HC holds an option to nationalize it. Since HC cannot credibly commit not to exercise this
option, MNC￿ s accounts for such threat when bargaining for the distribution of pro￿ts. HC
is a sovereign country and no legal court may oblige it to pay a compensation for assets
and returns expropriated. Nevertheless, we assume that HC￿ s opportunistic behaviour may
be triggered by a known and constant10 sunk cost N > 0. Let N include the losses due to
international sanctions, such as limited access to capital markets and restrictions on trade,
to the ruined reputation11 and to the lack of technological and managerial competences to
run the project on its own.12 Given that nationalization is a costly and irreversible move,
also HC may postpone it to bene￿t from information on ￿ uctuating future pro￿ts. Finally,
note that if the option to nationalize is kept open, a dividend, i.e. the pro￿t share 1 ￿ ￿; is
paid to HC.13
2.1 HC￿ s and MNC￿ s objective functions
Since MNC is a foreign ￿rm, the value of the project for HC accounts only for the pro￿ts
accruing to the local government (Engel and Fischer, 2008). That is, its share on pro￿ts as
long as the project is jointly run plus the share expropriated minus the cost of expropriation
once nationalization occurs. Hence, before investment has been undertaken the expected net
present value for HC at the general initial ￿ is






















j ￿0 = ￿
i
￿ G(￿I;￿) (2)
where ￿ > ￿ is the riskless interest rate14 and T k = inf(t > 0 j ￿t = ￿k) for k = I;N is the
random ￿rst time the process (1) hits respectively the time trigger for investment, ￿I; and
10Our frame may be easily modi￿ed to account for a stochastic cost of nationalization following, as in
Clark (2003), a geometric Brownian motion.
11Or changing perspective it may be equivalently interpreted as HC￿ s respect for property and contract
law.
12Such costs may be also seen as a ￿ ow over time. In this case, the analysis would not change in that one
may consider N as their present value at the time of nationalization.
13This is technically the main di⁄erence between the two American call options.
14To account for an appropriate adjustment for risk, we should have taken the expectation with respect
to a distribution of ￿ adjusted for risk neutrality. See Cox and Ross (1976) for further details. Finally, note
that if ￿ ￿ ￿ investing would never be optimal for MNC.
6the trigger for nationalization, ￿N:15 By G(￿I;￿), we will denote the value accruing to HC
at the investment time, T I.
Similarly, MNC￿ s expected net present value expected is given by













where the ￿ ow of pro￿ts gained from T I to T N minus the investment cost are discounted at
￿ < ￿I.16
2.2 The bargaining
MNC and HC￿ s relationship is characterized by con￿ ict but also convergent economic in-
terests. Both parties are interested in the activation of the extractive project. Before the
project starts an agreement on the distribution of the pro￿ts must be reached. The parties
must agree on a distributional parameter, ￿; which maximizes their joint interests. This
situation can be framed as a cooperative game which outcome may be determined applying
the Nash bargaining17 solution concept (Nash, 1950; Harsany, 1977).
HC and MNC gather the same information on the future prospects for ￿t and are averse
to the risk of internal con￿ ict.18 This allow to represent both parties by the concave Von
Neumann-Morgenstern functions W (H) and U (M) respectively de￿ned on the set of HC￿ s
and MNC￿ s expected net discounted values.19 A feasible outcome of the bargaining process,20
0 < ￿
￿ < 1; maximizes the following joint objective function
r = log[W (H) ￿ b w] + log[U (M) ￿ b u] (4)
where b w and b u are disagreement pay-o⁄s. However, note that in our problem b w = b u = 0
since if the bargaining fails the resource is not extracted.
3 E¢ cient Bargaining Set under Uncertainty and
Irreversibility
In this section we de￿ne the set of value over which the two parties play the bargaining game.
15See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 315) for the computation of expected present values.
16So far we have implicitly assumed that TN > TI (￿I < ￿N): This is clearly the only case where
bargaining makes economic sense . Otherwise, as we will show later, once undertaken the investment would
be simultaneously expropriated.
17The basic situation behind a Nash bargaining is very simple. Two agents want to share a pie of size 1.
Each of them simultaneously and without knowing the other agent￿ s proposal presents to a referee her request.
If the two requests are feasible, an agreement is reached and the pie is divided accordingly. Otherwise, the
game ends and the two agents obtain the disagreement pay-o⁄.
18This is not in con￿ ict with previously assumed risk neutrality. In fact, the parties may be neutral when
assessing a more general and di⁄erentiated set of ventures opportunities. On the contrary, when involved in
the bilateral setting HC-MNC, due to the speci￿city of the bargaining, the parties may show risk adversity.
19See Breccia and Salgado-Banda (2005) and Moretto and Rossini (1995,1996) for bargaining games over
a Nash product driven by a geometric Brownian motion.
20Both parties have a positive share and their sum is equal to 1. This implies that only internal solutions
are considered.
73.1 The Host Country
Once the investment is undertaken, HC holds the option to nationalize and earns the share
1￿￿ if the option is kept open. HC must decide when it is optimal to exercise such option.
This is an optimal stopping problem where G(￿;￿) must be maximized with respect to T N.21
Let V (￿) be the expected present value of total revenues from extraction once the project
has been activated. That is22
















Being ￿N the critical trigger for nationalization, over the continuation region, ￿ < ￿N; the
option to nationalize is unexercised. In this region, the Bellman equation for G(￿;￿) is23
￿G(￿;￿) = E [dG(￿;￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (6)









(￿;￿) ￿ ￿G(￿;￿) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (7)
The solution for the di⁄erential equation in (7) is24
G(￿;￿) = AN￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)V (￿) (8)
where 1 < ￿ < r
￿ is the positive root of ￿(￿) = 1
2￿2￿(￿ ￿ 1) + ￿￿ ￿ ￿:
The constant AH and ￿N can be determined attaching to (7) the following value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions






Note that (9) can be rearranged as follows:
AN￿
￿
N = V (￿N) ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)V (￿N) + N]
That is, at ￿N the value of keeping the option (LHS) must be equal to the net bene￿t of
nationalization (RHS). The ￿rst term on RHS is the expected present value of the entire
21This is equivalent to the maximization of (2). However, since TI is determined by MNC we can reduce
the problem to the maximization of G(￿;￿):
22See Harrison (1985, p. 44).
23If a market for trading options to expropriate existed, the return from keeping the option, namely
expected capital gain plus dividend, must be equal to what the holder would receive selling the option and
keeping the proceeds on a bank account paying ￿ as interest rate.
24See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 143, p. 180).
8￿ ow of pro￿ts while the term into square brackets stands for the cost associated to the
expropriation. Such cost is given by the expected present value of the share on the joint
project revenues implicitly given up nationalizing plus the nationalization cost.







AN = [￿V (￿N) ￿ N]￿
￿￿
N (12)
Note that ￿N is decreasing in ￿: This implies that as ￿ ! 1; the expropriation becomes in
expected terms more likely.
Finally, plugging (12) into (8) gives
G(￿;￿) =
(





+ (1 ￿ ￿)V (￿) for ￿ < ￿N
V (￿) ￿ N for ￿ ￿ ￿N
(13)
In (13) on the ￿rst line, the ￿rst term represents the value of the option to expropriate while
the second is the perpetuity paid if the option is never exercised. On the second line the
discounted net pay-o⁄ of nationalization.
3.2 The Multinational Corporation
MNC maximizes (3) with respect to T I taking T N as given. Let F (￿;￿) represent the
expected present value of the stream of pro￿ts gained by MNC once invested25























From (14) one can easily see that MNC is accounting for a ￿ ow of pro￿ts stopping at T N
due to nationalization.26
In the continuation region, ￿ < ￿I; the Bellman equation for M (￿;￿) is:
￿M (￿;￿) = E [dM (￿;￿)] (15)









(￿;￿) ￿ ￿M (￿;￿) = 0 (16)
25See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 315) for the computation of expected present values.
26From MNC￿ s perspective ￿N represents an absorbing barrier for (1).
9The guessed form for the solution to (16) is
M (￿;￿) = AI￿
￿ (17)
Imposing the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions



























Note that ￿I is not a⁄ected by ￿N.27 This means that with or without threat of nation-
alization the expected investment timing is the same. This result is consistent with the
dynamic programming principle of optimality used to solve the problem: if ￿I is the optimal
investment trigger at t = 0 then it should remain optimal for every t > 0: In other words,
any possible event occurring after ￿I has been hit has no impact on the optimal trigger:28
Substituting (21) into (17) gives
M (￿;￿) =
8
> > > > <














for ￿ < ￿I
￿
￿





￿ I for ￿I ￿ ￿ < ￿N
￿I for ￿ ￿ ￿N
(22)
MNC is aware that investment implicitly provides HC with the option to expropriate. This





= ￿V (￿N) ￿ E[e￿￿TNj￿0 = ￿I]: This
term discounts the pro￿ts expropriated for the random time period T N ￿ T I and corrects
the perpetuity ￿V (￿I): From (22) follows that the only case to matter in our analysis is
￿I < ￿N: Otherwise, for ￿I ￿ ￿N; investment makes no sense in that HC nationalizes it as
soon as it is undertaken.
Finally,
@￿I





￿ < 0: This result implies that to induce earlier
investment an higher share must be paid to compensate for the option value given up and
for the rising threat of nationalization (
@￿N
@￿ < 0).
4 Nash Bargaining and Cooperative Equilibrium
The bargaining on the pro￿t sharing rule ￿ must occur before the project activation (￿ <
￿I < ￿N). In this region MNC￿ s and HC￿ s value functions are respectively given by (22) and
(2).
27This can be easily seen solving the MNC￿ s problem with ￿N ! 1.
28See chapters 8 and 9 in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) discussing a similar result.
10Proposition 1 If the investment is undertaken then the following inequality must hold
￿





Proof. See section A.1 in the appendix for the proof
The inequality in (23) is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for investment. It must
hold for the bargaining to make economic sense. In fact, it requires that M (￿;￿) > 0
for ￿ < ￿I: Note that this in turn implies M (￿I;￿) > 0. The parameter ￿ represents
the magnitude of the punishment with respect to the scale of the investment expropriated.
By ￿ we can capture the impact that international sanctions, loss of reputation and other
costs have on the likelihood of nationalization and implicitly on investment decision. In
particular, note from (23) that ￿ > 1: This means that the punishment must be greater
than the investment cost. As ￿ increases the distance between the two thresholds, ￿N ￿ ￿I;
becomes larger, and in expected terms the ￿ ow of MNC￿ s pro￿ts has a longer duration. In
￿gure 1, we analyse some possible scenarios. It is interesting comparing plots (a) and (b)
that condition (23) does not hold for some ￿ in (a) while it may hold for the same ￿ over
some range of ￿ in (b). This is due to the pro￿t growth rate, ￿: In fact, if ￿ > 0; pro￿ts
increases at a faster rate and in expected terms the threshold ￿N is met earlier. This in turn
reduces MNC￿ s gain from joining HC. In (b) for ￿ = 1:5, the zero growth e⁄ect holds for
levels of volatility up to ￿ = 0:3. Above this value, the punishment is too mild and ￿ must
increase for condition (23) to hold.
FIGURE 1: f(￿) = ￿
￿￿1 ￿ ￿ for ￿ = 0:1; (a) ￿ = 0:05; (b) ￿ = 0





positive for ￿ < ￿I. This means that the bargaining should occur just a "while" before the
11investment trigger has been hit. By the continuity of the two value functions, it follows that
the objective function in (4) must be maximized at ￿I.29 Waiting up to ￿I both parties are
better o⁄ in that they may collect more information on future prospects.
4.1 Cooperative Equilibrium
Denote respectively by W (H) = H1￿p and U (M) = Mq HC￿ s and MNC￿ s utility functions.
Their degree of relative risk aversion is measured by 0 ￿ p < 1 and 0 < q ￿ 1. Let the two
parties play the cooperative game at T I: The equilibrium agreement will be represented by
the level of ￿
￿ maximizing (4).





























￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿ (26)
The problem in (25) makes sense if ￿
￿ >
￿￿1
￿￿￿1￿￿: By proposition (1) and since ￿ > 1; it
follows that ￿ ￿ 1 < ￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿: This means that over
￿￿1
￿￿￿1￿￿ < ￿
￿ < 1 a feasible bargaining




￿￿￿1￿￿ and the set enlarges. In other words, the threat of nationalization, restricting
the set of feasible bargaining outcomes, makes more di¢ cult to attain a mutually convenient
agreement. Finally, while ￿
￿ >
￿￿1
￿￿￿1￿￿ can be easily shown, to have ￿




1 ￿ ￿1￿￿ (27)
5 Some comparative statics and a numerical solution
In this section we derive and discuss some properties of the cooperative agreement. We will
show how pro￿t growth, ￿; and volatility, ￿; interacting through ￿ with the magnitude of
nationalization cost, ￿; and the relative risk aversion ratio, ￿; may impact on the bargaining
outcome.31
29More realistically, MNC and HC may agree before on a sharing rule conditional on ￿I:
30The second order condition holds always. See appendix A.2.
31See section A.3 in the appendix for the derivatives.
125.1 On the impact of pro￿t growth, volatility and risk aversion
Taking the derivative of (25) with respect to ￿ we obtain (see ￿gure 2)
(
@￿￿
@￿ > 0 for ￿
￿ < e ￿
@￿￿
@￿ ￿ 0 for ￿
￿ ￿ e ￿
(28)




@￿ < 0; by (11) and (20), an increase in ￿ implies both investment and nationaliza-
tion occurring later in expected terms. By (28) an interior e ￿ allows to distinguish between
two possible scenarios. This duality re￿ ects how the parties may di⁄erently trade o⁄ option
value and pro￿t share. If ￿
￿ < e ￿, as volatility soars up, MNC prefers to invest later when
pro￿ts are high enough and may accept a lower share. This in turn lightens the nation-
alization threat. In this case, HC is compensated with a larger share for the postponed
investment and a less valuable option to expropriate. Instead, when ￿
￿ ￿ e ￿ to encourage
earlier investment the local government agree on a larger ￿
￿ to MNC. However, note that a
larger share makes more tempting the option to nationalize and lowers the time trigger for
its exercise.
FIGURE 2: ￿ = 0:1; ￿ = 1
On the contrary, as ￿ rises both ￿N and ￿I decrease implying respectively earlier na-
tionalization and investment. In the bargaining room the parties may have di⁄erent deals.
Since
@￿
@￿ < 0; if ￿
￿ < e ￿; MNC relying on robust pro￿t growth prefers to wait and agree
on taking a smaller share. Here, the analysis above applies. Instead, if ￿
￿ ￿ e ￿ HC wants
to push the investment and would accept a lower share to induce it. This is balanced by
high pro￿t growth and a more valuable option to nationalize. However, HC must leave a
13higher share to MNC to compensate the option value given up and for a more severe threat
of nationalization.
Studying (26) subject to (27):
(a) as ￿ ! 1; ￿ ! 1 and both ￿N ! 1 and ￿I ! 1. Due to high uncertainty on future
pro￿t prospects the threat of nationalization vanishes. However, high uncertainty
a⁄ects also the timing of investment which is never undertaken.














(c) if ￿ = 0 as ￿ ! 0 then ￿ ! 1, ￿I !
￿￿￿
￿ I ; ￿N !
￿￿￿
￿ N and ￿
￿ = 1: Since as
￿ ! 1 then ￿1￿￿ ! 0; the feasible domain,
￿￿1
￿￿￿1￿￿ < ￿
￿ < 1; collapses and the
bargaining fails.32
Finally, since @￿￿
@￿ < 0 then @￿￿
@p > 0 and @￿￿
@q > 0:This result can be explained by the
disadvantage that the more risk adverse party has in bargaining (Roth, 1989). In fact,
keeping q constant and letting p ! 0, HC becomes less risk averse and an higher share 1￿￿
￿
is required to have a deal. The same e⁄ect applies as q ! 1: See ￿gure 3.
FIGURE 3: ￿ = 0:1; ￿ = 3; ￿ = 0:025
5.2 On the impact of nationalization cost
An increase in ￿ makes nationalization more costly in relative terms and as expected the
derivative of ￿
￿ with respect to ￿ is negative (See Figures 2 and 4). Hence, being the threat
of nationalization less severe MNC accept a lower share.
32The two value functions in (13) and (22) become linear and this implies that MNC and HC propose only
not conciliable requests.
14Taking the limit for ￿ ! 1; ￿
￿ decreases and tends to






FIGURE 4: ￿ = 0:1; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 0:025
Comparing (28) with (26), we note
￿
￿ ￿b ￿ =
￿1￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿
b ￿ > 0 (29)
and we can state that
Proposition 3 Under the threat of nationalization the share of pro￿ts accruing to MNC is
always higher than under no threat.
HC must pay a premium to induce investment under the threat of nationalization. How-
ever, changing perspective another interesting explanation could be given to the wedge in
(29). MNC is aware that by investing an option to expropriate is open. This is kept into
account during the bargaining process. Once agreed on the shares the two parties have
implicitly priced the option to expropriate. Hence, one can view such option as a part of
the compensation paid to HC in addition to the share 1 ￿ ￿
￿. In ￿gure 5, we show that
the wedge increases as volatility soars up. This can be explained by a more valuable option
to expropriate held by HC at the investment timing.33 The wedge reduces as ￿ increases.
As anticipated above, this is due to the advantage that less risk adverse parties have in
bargaining.
Finally, restricting by (27) the limit result in (28) we may draw some implications on the
role that ￿ and ￿ play under no threat of nationalization:34
33See appendix A.4.
34Note that the bargaining outcome would lead to b ￿ in other two cases. First, if the local government was
able to credibly commit not to nationalize, second if HC totally compensates MNC for the value expropriated.
15(i) as ￿ ! 1; ￿ ! 1 and ￿I ! 1: The investment is not undertaken due to high uncertainty
on ￿t .




￿I. This implies that





If ￿ ! 0 and the threat of expropriation is absent then the frame is deterministic. The
sharing rule is shaped by the pro￿t drift rate, ￿; the discount rate, ￿; and by relative













(iii) if ￿ ￿ 0 as ￿ ! 0 then ￿ ! 1, ￿I !
￿￿￿
￿ I and b ￿ = 1: Here, the same argument used
in (c) applies.
FIGURE 5: ￿ = 0:1; ￿ = 3; ￿ = 0:025
165.3 Numerical solution
We illustrate the results above through a numerical solution. Let normalize the investment
cost I = 1; and set the cost of nationalization N = 3; and the discount rate ￿ = 0:1: In
￿gures 6a and 6b, for pro￿t growth rates ￿ = 0:025 and ￿ = 0; we plot the optimal sharing
rule ￿
￿ for di⁄erent values of pro￿t volatility (￿). In addition, to stress again on the role of
relative risk aversion in bargaining, we show its impact on ￿
￿ for three di⁄erent scenarios. As
￿ increases HC, becoming less risk averse than MNC, is entitled to larger shares, 1 ￿ ￿
￿; on
pro￿t ￿ ow. Note, that for ￿ = 1; any asymmetry is present being both parties equally risk
averse or both risk neutral. In this case the pro￿t share is only a⁄ected by the asymmetrical
charge in terms of risk-taking. Focusing on ￿, the duality marked in (28) is straightforward.
FIGURE 6: ￿ = 0:1; ￿ = 3; (a) ￿ = 0:025; (b) ￿ = 0
Let run (26) for ￿ = 0:025, ￿ = 0:2 and ￿ = 1: Under these assumptions, MNC takes
approximately the 88;68% of each unit of pro￿t (￿
￿ = 0:8868060187) and leave the rest to
HC. Plugging the assumed parameters into (11) and (20) we respectively determine the time
triggers for investment, ￿I = 0:1604535594; and nationalization, ￿N = 0:4269609891:
In ￿gure 7, the value function, H (￿;￿
￿); and the net present value of nationalization,
NPV (￿;￿
￿) = V (￿)￿N; are plotted. Holding the option to nationalize up to ￿N is valuable
as shown by the gap between the two functions. Note also that even if continuous, H (￿;￿
￿)
is not di⁄erentiable at ￿I. This is due to the option to nationalize being conditional on the
investment.
To complete our illustration we draw in ￿gure 8 the value function, M (￿;￿
￿); and the
net present value of investment, NPV (￿;￿
￿) = ￿
￿





￿ I. Again, to
keep the option open up to ￿I is valuable. Let analyse the impact of nationalization on the
net present value. This impact is absolutely clear for ￿ ￿ ￿N where the investment would
be instantaneously expropriated and result in a loss equal to ￿1. Now, note that under no
17threat NPV (￿;￿
￿) = ￿V (￿)￿I which is linear and increasing in ￿. The e⁄ect of the threat
of nationalization is then shown by the curvature of NPV (￿;￿
￿): As ￿ approaches ￿N, a
more likely nationalization lowers the net present value from investment. This reduction is
so drastic that NPV (￿;￿
￿) is negative for some ￿I < ￿ < ￿N:
FIGURE 7: ￿
￿ = 0:8868060187; ￿I = 0:1604535594; ￿N = 0:4269609891
￿ = 0:1; ￿ = 0:025; ￿ = 3; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 0:2; I = 1
FIGURE 8: ￿
￿ = 0:8868060187; ￿I = 0:1604535594; ￿N = 0:4269609891
￿ = 0:1; ￿ = 0:025; ￿ = 3; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 0:2; I = 1
186 Conclusions
The exploitation of natural resources in developing countries can support their economic
growth and fund social welfare improvements. Often, in the presence of funding constraints
and lack of technological skills the activation of extractive projects may be problematic. In
this case, local governments can bene￿t from joint ventures with multinational corporations
o⁄ering capital and technology.
Unfortunately, high political hazard may limit joint venture formation. The abuse of
national sovereignty concept to support the existence of a right to expropriate or nationalize
foreign investment weakens the legal frame regulating contractual agreements (Mahajan,
1990). In the lack of a credible commitment, expropriation and nationalization may be a
temptation hard to resist when pro￿ts are high and local governments are under populist
pressure for pro￿t redistribution. International sanctions and the fall of future FDI may
limit but not deter this opportunistic behaviour.
In this paper these con￿ icting and mutual economic interests have been considered. We
have proposed a model where cooperative bargaining meets the real option approach. Both
parties holds an option, respectively on investment and nationalization. Both decisions
are characterized by uncertain pay-o⁄s and irreversibility. Hence, accounting for market
uncertainty and additional political risk we shape and fully characterize a feasible agreement
inducing foreign investment.
We believe that this framework should be extended at least in two respects. First, we have
considered only the case where the government takes all the "cake". It would be interesting
to apply our frame to analyse the more subtle threat of "creeping expropriation" (Schnitzer,
1999, 2002). That is, the increasingly common practice by which, after an agreement has
been signed, governments violate its terms imposing a change in MNC￿ s pro￿t taxation,
import or export duties, stricter environmental and labour regulations. As one can easily
see, the main issue with creeping expropriation is to distinguish between the legitimate
exercise of government prerogatives and a clear act of expropriation.
Second, the analysis can be extended to account for government time inconsistency.
Time inconsistency may be due to changing time preferences (Strotz, 1956). This can be
a consequence of short political cycles for democratic governments. Each government in
power to magnify the probability of re-election needs to please the currently living political
body. This consideration modi￿es the time preferences which may show a certain bias for
the present and induce rush on decisions which entails present bene￿ts in front of future
costs. A similar issue may arise also when dictatorship are considered. In this case the point




For the bargaining to occur M (￿;￿) must be positive. From (22) follows ￿ < ￿￿￿1. Taking
the logarithm on both sides:
ln￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)ln￿ < 0
Being ￿ > 1 it is easy to show that if such condition holds then ￿ > 1: Finally, note that
for ￿ ! 1, the condition does not hold at the limit.
A.2 Optimal ￿
￿
The second order condition for the optimality of ￿
￿ requires @2r
@￿2 j￿￿=￿< 0. Using (25) and






















































￿ (￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿)
< 0
















Proposition (1) implies 1￿￿
￿￿1￿￿ > 0: In addition, since ￿
￿ > 1￿ 1
￿ then ￿(1￿￿
￿)￿1 < 0:



































20A.3 Properties of ￿
￿
In this section we present the derivatives of ￿






￿ ￿ ￿ 1
￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿￿
￿￿ < 0























































￿(1 + ln￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿)
￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿ R 0 for ￿
￿ Q e ￿
where e ￿ = 1
1+ln￿￿￿1￿￿:
A.4 Impact of volatility on the option to nationalize
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